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Abstract
The article presents the status quo of the law of retrial in
Germany and gives an overview of the law and practice of
the latter in favour of the convicted and to the disadvantage
of the defendant. Particularly, the formal and material pre-
requisites for a successful petition to retry the criminal case
are subject to a detailed presentation and evaluation.
Because no official statistics are kept regarding successful
retrial processes in Germany, the actual number of judicial
errors is primarily the subject of more or less well-founded
estimates by legal practitioners and journalists. However,
there are a few newer empirical studies devoted to different
facets of the subject. These studies will be discussed in this
article in order to outline the state of empirical research on
the legal reality of the retrial procedure. Against this back-
ground, the article will ultimately highlight currently dis-
cussed reforms and subject these to a critical evaluation as
well. The aim of the recent reform efforts is to add a ground
for retrial to the disadvantage of the defendant for cases in
which new facts or evidence indicate that the acquitted per-
son was guilty. After detailed discussion, the proposal in
question is rejected, inter alia for constitutional reasons.
Keywords: criminal proceedings, retrial in favour of the con-
victed, retrial to the disadvantage of the defendant, Germa-
ny, judicial errors
1 Introduction
The German Public Prosecutor’s Office (Staatsanwalt-
schaft) likes to market itself (at least within its own
ranks) as ‘the most objective authority in the world’;1
pursuant to § 160(2) German Code of Criminal Proce-
dure (StPO) it must ‘ascertain both incriminating and
exonerating circumstances’, and pursuant to § 296(2)
StPO it may ‘make use of [the permitted legal recourse]
in favour of the defendant’ as well. If one adds to this
the fact that in German criminal procedural law – unlike
in procedural codes which are characterised by the
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1. Under reference to a dictum of the Berlin Senior Public Prosecutor and
later General Public Prosecutor Isenbiel; cf. J. Eisele and C. Trentmann,
‘Die Staatsanwaltschaft – ‘objektivste Behörde der Welt’?’ [The German
Public Prosecutor’s Office – ‘The Most Objective Authority in the
World?’], 72 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2365, at 2366 (2019).
notion of the adversarial system – the court is intended
to have a quite active role in examination of the truth
(cf. § 244(2) StPO), then one could come to the conclu-
sion that there exist sufficient safety precautions against
judicial errors even in such cases where the defendant is
defended only poorly or not at all. As a number of spec-
tacular errors of justice2 have shown in the recent past,
wrongful convictions are nevertheless (one might be
tempted to say: obviously) made in criminal cases even
in German courtrooms. The following article therefore
intends to focus on the question of what opportunities
are available to suspects and the Public Prosecutor’s
Office in the event that they consider a legally effective
criminal conviction to be incorrect. Based on a detailed
investigation of the legal framework conditions and
(somewhat scarce) knowledge of the legal reality, we will
also pursue the issue of whether there is a need for legal
reform regarding the mechanisms established in the
German criminal process for correcting judicial errors.
It must be pointed out at this juncture that there exist
only limited corresponding opportunities for correction,
and that the German legal system traditionally3 assigns a
great deal of value to the institute of legal force. A pecu-
liarity of German law is the possibility of proceeding
against a legally effective criminal conviction with a con-
stitutional complaint (Urteilsverfassungsbeschwerde)
before the German Federal Court (Bundesverfassungsger-
icht). To do so, the complainant must plead that his
basic rights or rights equal to his basic rights – e.g. the
right to a legally competent judge pursuant to § 101(1)
(2) Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany
(Grundgesetz; GG) or the right to a legal hearing pur-
suant to § 103(1) GG – have been violated, § 93(1) no. 4a
GG, § 13 no. 8a German Act on the Federal Constitu-
tional Court (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz; BVerfGG).
An extensive examination of the peculiarities of the con-
stitutional complaint process is beyond the scope of this
article and would also detract too much from the actual
focus; we must therefore satisfy ourselves with a few
2. Examples can be found in R. Neuhaus, ‘Fehlerquellen im Ermittlungsver-
fahren aus der Sicht der Verteidigung’ [Sources of Errors in Investiga-
tions from the Perspective of the Defence], 35 Strafverteidiger 185
(2015); P. Velten, ‘Fehlentscheidungen im Strafverfahren’ [Wrong Deci-
sions in Criminal Proceedings], 162 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht
387 (2015).
3. For an overview of the historical development of the law of retrials, cf.
C. Arnemann, Defizite der Wiederaufnahme in Strafsachen [Shortcom-
ings in Retrials in Criminal Cases] (2019), at 169 et seq.; S. Bayer, Die
strafrechtliche Wiederaufnahme im deutschen, französischen und eng-
lischen Recht [The Retrial under Criminal Law in German, French and
English Law] (2019), at 51 et seq.
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general remarks and refer interested readers to the rele-
vant specialist literature.4 Instead, the focus of this arti-
cle will be the correction mechanism inherent in the
criminal process: the retrial that is governed under § 359
et seq. StPO and which reverts the case back to the main
proceedings if successful.
In the traditional reading, the legal force is interrupted
in a retrial in the interest of a substantively correct deci-
sion. In one of the ‘classic’ textbooks on criminal proce-
dural law, the basic idea of the retrial is summarised to
the effect that, in exceptional cases, the legal force
must be withdrawn if facts which come to light after
the decision cause the ruling to appear obviously
incorrect in a manner that is unbearable for the sense
of justice or … if the sentence is not based on a mini-
mum of procedural correctness.5
In the words of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, the retrial instrument ‘is intended to resolve the
conflict between the principles of material justice and
legal certainty, both of which are derived with constitu-
tional effect from the rule of law’.6
As Frister has shown in his commentary on § 359 et seq.
StPO,7 this formulation is in fact too imprecise in sever-
al aspects: thus, he first voices his doubt that ‘even for
the purpose of achieving substantive justice, a retrial is
only sensible if an at least potentially more just decision
can be expected from a new trial’. With increasing tem-
poral distance to the act which is the subject of the pro-
ceedings, this could become questionable due to the
usual clouding of sources of evidence over time.8 It must
furthermore be taken into account that the faith of the
general public in the rule of law, as is expressed in the
topos of legal certainty, may also be damaged if new
knowledge indicates that the legally effective ruling suf-
fers from serious defects.9 A retrial on the basis of addi-
4. For a more comprehensive examination, cf. M. Jahn, C. Krehl, M. Löf-
felmann & G. Güntge, Die Verfassungsbeschwerde in Strafsachen [The
Constitutional Complaint in Criminal Cases] (2nd edn, 2017).
5. C. Roxin and B. Schünemann, Strafverfahrensrecht [Criminal Procedural
Law] (29th edn, 2017), § 57.1 under reference to L. Greco, Strafpro-
zesstheorie und materielle Rechtskraft [Criminal Procedure in Theory
and Substantive Legal Force] (2015), at 883 et seq.
6. BVerfG [German Constitutional Court], Resolution of the 2nd Chamber
of the Second Senate of 14 September 2006 – 2 BvR 123/06 inter alia,
NJW 2007, 207. Agreement in W. Schmidt, in R. Hannich (ed.), Karls-
ruher Kommentar zur StPO [Karlsruhe Commentary on the StPO] (8th
edn, 2019), § 359.3; B. Schmitt, in: L. Meyer-Goßner and B. Schmitt
(eds.), StPO mit GVG und Nebengesetzen [StPO with GVG and Ancil-
lary Acts] (63rd edn, 2020), § 359.1.
7. H. Frister, in: J. Wolter (ed.), Systematischer Kommentar zur StPO [Sys-
tematic Commentary on the StPO] (5th edn, 2016), § 359.1 et seq.; see
also H. Frister and T. Müller, ‘Reform der Wiederaufnahme in Strafsa-
chen’ [Retrial Reform in Criminal Cases], 52 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik
101, at 102 (2019).
8. Frister, above n. 7, § 359.1 under reference to G. Grünwald, ‘Die mate-
rielle Rechtskraft im Strafverfahren der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’
[Substantive Legal Force in Criminal Proceedings in the Federal Republic
of Germany], 86 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft
Beiheft 94, at 103 et seq. (1974).
9. Cf. in this regard also R.J. Norris, J.N. Weintraub, J.R. Acker, A.D. Red-
lich & C.L. Bonventre, ‘The Criminal Costs of Wrongful Convictions:
Can We Reduce Crime by Protecting the Innocent?’, 19 Criminology &
Public Policy 367, at 376 (2020).
tional sources of knowledge could therefore be refused
on the part of the public only on the grounds of the
expenditure associated with a new trial, and the risk that
evidence of an act that was actually committed may fail
due to the passing of time; on the part of the defendant,
the (individual) interest in not having to be subjected to
a new criminal trial, protected by the principle of ne bis
in idem (§ 103(3) GG), must be taken into account.10 In
Frister’s opinion, what arises from this solidification of
the range of interests is that the German legislator has
correctly inserted the retrial to the disadvantage of the
defendant and the retrial in favour of the convicted11 under
§ 359 et seq. StPO into a differentiating regulation, and
has particularly (only) permitted a retrial in the case of
the former ‘if a potentially more just decision can be
expected in a new trial on the grounds of additional
sources of knowledge’ (§ 359 nos. 4, 5 StPO).12 In the
course of this article we will, inter alia, investigate
whether the law and the practice of retrying criminal
cases in Germany are in fact suited to establishing an
appropriate balance between the complex groups of
interests outlined above.13
Following a brief outline of the constitutional complaint
against a ruling in criminal cases as discussed above (2),
the third section will initially present the status quo of
the law of retrial in Germany (3). Afterwards, we pro-
vide an overview of the state of empirical research into
the legal reality of the retrial procedure (4). On this
basis, we will then highlight current proposed reforms
and subject these to a critical evaluation (5). We offer a
brief conclusion at the end (6).
2 Constitutional Complaints in
Criminal Cases
As already indicated, besides the petition to retry the
criminal case, there exists a further extraordinary legal
remedy14 in Germany which allows proceedings against
a criminal conviction that has already become legally
effective: the constitutional complaint governed under
§ 93(1) no. 4a GG and § 13 no. 8a, 90 et seq. BVerfGG.
The Federal Constitutional Court is responsible for
making a decision on the constitutional complaint but
10. Frister, above n. 7, § 359.2.
11. Regarding the linguistic differentiation based on § 362 no. 4 StPO
(Retrial to the disadvantage of the acquitted in case of a believable con-
fession) which will also be taken as a basis in the following, cf. Frister,
above n. 7, § 359.3 under reference to S. Brinkmann, Zum Anwen-
dungsbereich der §§ 359 ff. StPO. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Feh-
lerkorrektur über das strafrechtliche Wiederaufnahmeverfahren [On the
Scope of Application of §§ 359 et seq. StPO. Opportunities and Limits
of Correcting Errors via the Criminal Law Procedure of the Retrial]
(2017), at 39-40.
12. Frister, above n. 7, § 359.5.
13. Frister’s discussion of different approaches to reform in Frister, above
n. 7, § 359.85 et seq.; § 362.3 et seq.
14. On classification, cf. H. Bethge, in T. Maunz, B. Schmidt-Bleibtreu,
F. Klein & H. Bethge, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [German Act on
the Federal Constitutional Court], 58. EL Januar (2020), § 90.23.
74
ELR 2020 | No. 4 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000177
emphasises in its settled case law that it is not an
‘instance of super-review’ (a review of a review):
It is not the court’s function to review, or even to
standardise, the jurisprudence of the responsible spe-
cialised courts in their interpretation of the so-called
‘ordinary law’ (einfaches Recht) for the correctness of
such. Rather, the court may only become involved if
the decision of a court exhibits errors of interpreta-
tion which are based on an essentially incorrect view
of the significance and scope of a basic right, or if the
result of the interpretation is not congruent with the
norms of basic law. (cf. Decision of the Federal Con-
stitutional Court (BVerfGE) 18, 85 92 f.; settled case
law (stRspr))15
Although the constitutional complaint can by law be
lodged by ‘anyone’ without engaging a lawyer,16 there
exist a number of admissibility requirements which – at
least in the interpretation of such by the Federal Consti-
tutional Court – are not always easy to grasp even for
professional lawyers.17 Thus, the court adds to the rule
on exhaustion of legal remedies, which is explicitly
standardised under § 90(2)(1) BVerfGG,18 a (more com-
prehensive) principle of subsidiarity which demands
that the complainant ‘exploit all procedural possibilities
available to him in order to effect a correction to a con-
tested constitutional violation’.19 The complainant may
not be referred to the bringing of wholly hopeless or
clearly impermissible legal remedies;20 however, such
remedies should also not be capable of impeding the
course of the one-month period set for bringing the con-
stitutional complaint as standardised under § 93(1)
BVerfGG.21 As this brief insight into the case law of the
Federal Constitutional Court shows, the court requires
particularly complex prognostic considerations of the
complainant in his efforts to satisfy the requirements for
15. BVerfG, Resolution of the 2nd Chamber of the Second Senate of
24 October 1999 – 2 BvR 1821/99, BeckRS 1999, 23087 n. 7.
16. In principle, proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court are
free of charge; however, a fee may be charged in case of misuse (§ 34
BVerfGG).
17. Cf. G. Lübbe-Wolff & C. Geisler, ‘Neuere Rechtsprechung des BVerfG
zum Vollzug von Straf- und Untersuchungshaft. Bericht mit Hinweisen
zu einigen häufig übersehenen Erfolgsvoraussetzungen der Verfas-
sungsbeschwerde’ [Recent Case Law of the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court on Enforcement of Criminal Custody and Remand. Report
with Notes on Certain Frequently Overlooked Requirements for the
Success of Constitutional Complaints], 24 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht
478, at 479 (2004); G. Lübbe-Wolff, ‘Die erfolgreiche Verfassungs-
beschwerde. Wie man das Unwahrscheinliche wahrscheinlicher macht’
[The Successful Constitutional Complaint. How to Make the Unlikely
More Likely], Anwaltsblatt 509, at 512 (2005). A comprehensive over-
view of the admissibility requirements for a constitutional complaint in
criminal cases can be found in M. Jahn, in Jahn, Krehl, Löffelmann &
Güntge, above n. 4, n. 63 et seq.
18. § 90(2)(1) BVerfGG states, ‘If legal recourse against the violation is per-
missible, then the constitutional complaint may only be brought after
the legal recourse has been exhausted’.
19. BVerfGE 115, 81 (91 f.) under reference to BVerfGE 74, 102 (113);
104, 65 (70); for a more comprehensive examination, cf. Bethge, above
n. 14, § 90.401 et seq.
20. Cf. BVerfGE 55, 154 (157); 70, 180 (186); 91, 93 (106); 102, 197
(198).
21. Cf. BVerfGE 5, 17 (19 f.); 19, 323 (330); 63, 80 (85); 91, 93 (106).
subsidiarity.22 Similar difficulties can also be posed by a
substantiation of the constitutional complaint which sat-
isfies the requirements of the court: in the wording of
the law, that the complainant must ‘specify the right
which has allegedly been violated, as well as the act or
omission of the organ or authority by which the com-
plainant claims his or her rights have been violated’
(§ 92 BVerfGG). According to the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, this results in an obligation to present or
(comprehensively) reproduce the content of all affected
decisions of the authorities or the courts and other doc-
umentation essential to the proceedings (written sub-
missions, etc.), which in principle should allow the
court to make a decision without referring to the case
files.23 This requirement too is not evident a priori from
the law and appears liable to quickly overwhelm legal
laypersons.
Regarding the justification of the constitutional com-
plaint against a ruling in criminal cases, one can in prin-
ciple look to the differentiation between violations of
substantive law and violations of procedural law which
is common in the review process (dem Revisionsverfah-
ren).24 However, in doing so, one must take into account
the reservation of the court, stated at the beginning of
this section, that it is not an ‘instance of super-review’:
errors in the application of ‘ordinary law’ are not suffi-
cient in and of themselves; instead, a ‘violation of a spe-
cific constitutional right’ must be demonstrated.25
Whilst constitutional law is affected ‘if the regulation
violated determines the manner, in which the judge is
called to and comes to reach a verdict’,26 substantive
legal errors may refer either to the unconstitutionality of
the substantive law principles underlying the ruling or
the unconstitutionality of the application of norms by
the specialist courts.27 An example of a regulation
declared void and incommensurate with the Grundgesetz
for a constitutional complaint against a ruling due to a
violation of the principle of definiteness (§ 103(2) GG) is
§ 43a German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch; StGB)
(old version) which stipulated the imposition of a forfei-
22. Cf. on this dilemma, with respect to a complaint regarding the right to
be heard (Anhörungsrüge) governed under ordinary law in, inter alia, §
33a, § 356a StPO, M. Lindemann, ‘§ 3. Prozessgrundrechte und ihre
Bedeutung für das Strafverfahren’ [Basic Procedural Rights and their
Importance in Criminal Proceedings], in E. Hilgendorf, H. Kudlich & B.
Valerius (eds.), Handbuch des Strafrechts, Band 7, Grundlagen des
Strafverfahrensrechts [Criminal Law Handbook, Vol 7, Basics of Criminal
Procedural Law] (2020), n. 36 et seq.
23. Cf. BVerfGE 88, 40 (45); 93, 266 (288); more comprehensive in Lübbe-
Wolff and Geisler, above n. 17, at 479; Lübbe-Wolff, above n. 17, at
515-6.
24. Cf. C. Krehl and M. Löffelmann in Jahn, Krehl, Löffelmann & Güntge, n.
420.
25. Ibid.
26. M. Löffelmann, in Jahn, Krehl, Löffelmann & Güntge, above n. 4,
n. 421 This may relate to the right to a fair trial, effective legal
protection, or the right to be heard, for example. For a comprehensive
overview of the importance of the substantive basic rights and basic
procedural rights for criminal proceedings, cf. M Lindemann, ‘§ 2 and
§ 3’, in E. Hilgendorf, H. Kudlich & B. Valerius (eds.), Handbuch des
Strafrechts, Band 7, Grundlagen des Strafverfahrensrechts (2020).
27. Löffelmann, above n. 26, n. 553 et seq.
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ture of assets.28 If a criminal judgement is based on a
legal provision that is void or incompatible with the
Basic Law, proceedings may be resumed even after the
judgement has become final, as is stated in § 79(1)
BVerfGG.
From a quantitative point of view, constitutional com-
plaints against criminal convictions play a not too insig-
nificant role in the overall occurrence of constitutional
complaints lodged with the Federal Constitutional
Court;29 however, it must also be taken into account that
the proportion of successful constitutional complaints in
recent years has consistently been below 2% (2019:
1.54%).30
3 Legal Framework for the
Retrial Procedure
Due to its inherent restriction to a genuinely constitu-
tional control of the sentencing practice of the criminal
courts, the constitutional complaint is of somewhat sec-
ondary importance for the context of correcting judicial
errors discussed here. What is significantly more rele-
vant from a thematic perspective is the retrying of a
criminal trial, the legal framework conditions of which
will therefore be considered in more detail below.
3.1 Grounds for a Retrial
The grounds for retrying a case can be found under
§ 359 and § 362 StPO; here, the former norm governs
the retrial in favour of the convicted and the latter to the
disadvantage of the defendant.
3.1.1 Systematics
To improve understanding, we should first provide a
systematic overview of the legally standardised grounds
for retrial: thus, a retrial is possible both in favour of the
convicted and to the disadvantage of the defendant due to
criminal acts committed in connection with the passing
of the sentence (so-called retrial propter falsa, § 359 no.
1-3, 362 no. 1-3 StPO). These may consist in the falsifi-
cation of a document that was crucial to the decision, a
false statement made by a witness or expert and the
criminal violation of public duty by a judge or juror
involved in the reaching of a verdict – e.g. the accept-
ance of a benefit, corruption or perverting the course of
justice. Moreover, a retrial in favour of the convicted can
also be held in the following cases: annulment of a civil
judgement which the criminal conviction is based on
(§ 359 no. 4 StPO); the bringing of new, favourable facts
or evidence (so-called retrial propter nova; § 359 no. 5
StPO); and in cases where the ruling is based on a viola-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights
28. Cf. BVerfGE 105, 135.
29. Of the 5,158 constitutional complaints lodged in 2019, 1,322 were
lodged against decisions of the criminal courts; cf. BVerfG, Annual Sta-
tistics 2019, accessible online www.bverfge.de.
30. For a comparison across several years, see BVerfG, Annual Statistics
2019, accessible online www.bverfge.de.
(ECHR) identified by the ECtHR (§ 359 no. 6 StPO).
Pursuant to § 79(1) BVerfGG, a retrial in favour of the
convicted shall ultimately be considered if the ruling is
based on a norm or the interpretation of a norm which
the Federal Constitutional Court has declared incom-
mensurate with the Grundgesetz. A retrial to the
disadvantage of the defendant is possible not only in the
cases mentioned at the outset, but also in the event that
the defendant gives a believable confession (§ 362 no. 4
StPO). On the other hand, a retrial to the disadvantage of
the defendant in the event of new facts or evidence is
excluded in principle. The law provides for an excep-
tion only in the event of closure of proceedings by
means of a legally effective penalty order (which is only
based on a summary examination of the facts31) if the
new facts or evidence are suitable for justifying the sen-
tencing of a crime32 (§ 373a(1) StPO).33
3.1.2 Grounds for a Retrial in Favour of the Convicted
If one examines the opportunities for effecting a retrial
in favour of the convicted in more detail, then it initially
becomes clear that the grounds standardised under § 359
nos. 1 to 4 StPO are regularly only considered in the
event that new facts or evidence comes to light. From a
technical perspective, therefore, these are special cases
of § 359 no. 5 StPO.34 However, the demand to strike
§ 359 nos. 1 to 4, which is occasionally inferred from this
assessment,35 must be rejected. In doing so, we must
first consider that § 359 no. 3 StPO, which is related to
the criminal violation of public duty by a judge or juror
involved in the ruling, is designed as absolute grounds
for a retrial – unlike the other variations of § 359 StPO,
here there is no demand for proof of the effect of the
defect on the content of the ruling. The convicted per-
son would thus be in a worse position if § 359 no. 3
StPO were stricken.36 Arguing against a striking of § 359
nos. 1, 2 and 4 StPO, it is stated that here too the legal
situation for the convicted would be effectively made
worse in the light of the generally very restrictive han-
31. The penalty order proceedings governed under § 407 et seq. StPO are
written proceedings, in which the Public Prosecutor’s Office submits a
written proposal for a decision to the court. Pursuant to § 408(3)(1)
StPO, ‘the judge shall comply with the application of the public prose-
cution office if he has no reservations about issuing the summary penal-
ty order’. The defendant then has the opportunity to lodge an objection
within two weeks of notification of the penalty order (§ 410(1)(1)
StPO) and thus to force (largely) regular main proceedings. If no legally
effective objection is made, then the penalty order is equal to a legally
effective criminal conviction (§ 410(3) StPO).
32. Pursuant § 12(1) StGB, crimes are ‘unlawful acts which are subject at
least to a prison sentence of one year or more’.
33. For criticism of this regulation, cf. Frister, above n. 7, § 373a.5.
34. In the sense of A. Engländer and T. Zimmermann, in C. Knauer (ed.),
Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, Band 3/1 [Munich Commentary on
the StPO, vol 3/1] (2019), § 359.2; see also Frister, above n. 7,
§ 359.4; Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.3.
35. P. Deml, Zur Reform der Wiederaufnahme des Strafverfahrens [On
Retrial Reform in Criminal Proceedings] (1979), at 103 et seq.; J. Meyer,
Wiederaufnahmereform: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung zur
Reform des Rechts der Wiederaufnahme des Strafverfahrens [Retrial
Reform: A Legal Comparative Examination of the Reform of the Right
to Retrial in Criminal Proceedings] (1977), at 93 et seq.
36. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.2.
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dling of § 359 no. 5 StPO by the case law – as discussed
in more detail later in this section.37
According to § 359 no. 1 StPO, a retrial in favour of the
convicted shall be considered ‘if a document presented
in the main proceedings as genuine was not genuine or
was falsified to his disadvantage’. In this respect, the
term document under substantive law, in the sense of
§ 267 StGB (Falsification of documents), must be taken
as a basis;38 accordingly, a document is ‘any physical
embodiment of thoughts which is suitable and intended
for use as evidence in legal communication, and which
states its author’.39 Sometimes, an analogous application
to technical recordings in the sense of § 268 StGB (e.g. a
truck’s black box) is also considered.40 The document is
not genuine if the declaration contained therein does not
originate from the person indicated as its author.41 The
bringing of a document to the disadvantage of the con-
victed must be assumed if it cannot be excluded that the
document influenced the ruling to the disadvantage of
the convicted.42 It is contested whether § 364, clause 1
StPO, which, for petitions for retrial based on the claim-
ing of a criminal act, requires the presence of a legally
effective sentence on the grounds of this act or non-
prosecution of such which is not supported by a lack of
evidence, is applicable to § 359 no. 1 StPO. The prevail-
ing opinion rejects such by referring to the wording of
§ 359 no. 1 StPO which deviates from § 359 nos. 2 and 3
StPO and specifically contains no reference to a require-
ment of criminal liability.43
According to § 359 no. 2 StPO, a retrial in favour of the
convicted shall furthermore be considered
if the witness or expert is guilty of wilfully or negli-
gently violating their oath or of making an intention-
ally false statement under oath in a statement or
37. Cf. Frister, above n. 7, § 359.85. However, § 359 no. 5 StPO is given a
catch-all function in those cases where the petition for retrial is based
on the claiming of a criminal act, but where no legally effective sen-
tence has yet been rendered against this act (§ 364, clauses 1, 2 StPO);
cf. here, Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.2.
38. Prevailing opinion; cf. R. Eschelbach, in B. von Heintschel-Heinegg &
J. Bockemühl (eds.), KMR – Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung
[Commentary on the German Code of Criminal Procedure], 97. EL May
(2020), § 359.38; J. Kaspar, in H. Satzger, W. Schluckebier & G. Wid-
maier (eds.), Strafprozessordnung [German Code of Criminal Procedure]
(4th edn, 2020), § 359.10; Schmitt, above n. 6, § 359.4; T. Singeln-
stein, in J. Graf (ed.), BeckOK-Strafprozessordnung [Beck Online
Commentary on German Code of Criminal Procedure] (36th edn, as at:
1 January 2020), § 359.8; conversely, in favour of establishing a proce-
dural concept of a document (restriction to readable written documents
signed by hand according to § 249), cf. K. Marxen and F. Tiemann, Die
Wiederaufnahme in Strafsachen [Retrials in Criminal Cases] (3rd edn,
2014), n. 137.
39. Singelnstein, above n. 38, § 359.8 with citations.
40. For example, Kaspar, above n. 38, § 359.10; Schmidt, above n. 6,
§ 359.6; Schmitt, above n. 6, § 359.5; conversely, Engländer and Zim-
mermann, above n. 34, § 359.18; Eschelbach, above n. 38, § 359.41.
41. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.19; Frister, above
n. 7, § 359.19; each with citations.
42. Cf. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 359.10.
43. Cf. Eschelbach, above n. 38, § 359.57; J. Kaspar, above n. 38,
§ 359.11; each with citations; generally also BGH [German Federal
Supreme Court], Resolution of 20 December 2002 – StB 15/02, NStZ
2003, 678 (679); alternative opinion, Frister, above n. 7, § 359.20;
Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.9.
appraisal presented to the disadvantage of the convic-
ted.
Since the assertion of these grounds for a retrial also
claims the occurrence of a criminal act, the require-
ments of § 364, clause 1 StPO (legally effective judge-
ment or non-prosecution which is not based on a lack of
evidence) must be present.44 Here too, an effect to the
disadvantage of the convicted must be assumed if a neg-
ative influence of the witness statement or expert
appraisal on the ruling cannot be excluded;45 according
to the prevailing opinion, however, it should not be nec-
essary that the ruling is based on that part of the state-
ment or appraisal which has been asserted as incorrect.46
Thus, a retrial in favour of the convicted can also be
considered pursuant to § 359 no. 3 stop
if a judge or lay judge who participated in reaching
the judgment was guilty of a culpable breach of his
official duties in relation to the case, unless the viola-
tion was caused by the convicted person himself.
The criminal act must have been committed ‘with
respect to the case’, and may not simply have occurred
‘on the occasion’ of the activities of a judge – such as in
the form of insulting the defendant.47 The direct or
indirect causing of the violation of public duty by the
convicted (e.g. by bribing the judge who is acting con-
trary to his obligations) excludes the application of § 359
no. 3 StPO.48 What is criticised is the very high hurdle
for a retrial presented by the requirement for a criminal
act – such as perverting the course of justice (§ 339
StGB), accepting benefits or corruption (§ 331, § 332
StGB), unlawful detention or coercion (§ 239, § 240
StGB); however, only the legislator would have the
authority to reduce such to any form of conscious viola-
tion of public duty with respect to the case as has been
proposed (and is certainly worth considering).49 The
restriction to persons directly involved in the reaching
of a verdict is also rightly questioned since judicial
errors – as shown not least of all by international
research into this topic50 – can also be traced back to the
44. Cf. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 359.13.
45. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.27; Frister, above
n. 7, § 359.25; J. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 359.13.
46. Higher County Court Düsseldorf, Resolution of 6 December 1949 – Ws
250/49, NJW 1950, 616; Schmitt, above n. 6, § 359.12; alternative
opinion Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.26; Frister,
above n. 7, § 359.25 (in case of lack of basis, consideration within
framework of § 359 no. 5 StPO only).
47. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.30; Schmidt,
above n. 6, § 359.13.
48. The mere knowledge that a third party has effected the violation of
public duty without any personal involvement of the convicted person is
harmless, however; cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34,
§ 359.31; Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.14.
49. Demanded by Greco, above n. 5, at 944 and 954; generally in agree-
ment, Kaspar, above n. 38, § 359.16.
50. The significance of misconduct on the part of the police and the public
prosecutor for the occurrence of judicial errors is particularly well docu-
mented for the US justice system (cf. R. Covey, ‘Police Misconduct as a
Cause of Wrongful Convictions’, 90 Washington University Law
Review 1133 (2013); J. Petro and N. Petro, ‘The Prosecutor and
77
Michael Lindemann & Fabienne Lienau doi: 10.5553/ELR.000177 - ELR 2020 | No. 4
misconduct of other persons involved in the proceed-
ings (in the present context, in particular: the police or
the public prosecutor’s office).51
§ 359 no. 4 StPO also permits a retrial in favour of the
convicted ‘if a civil judgement, which the criminal con-
viction is based on, is annulled by another legally effec-
tive ruling’. In the prevailing opinion, the scope of
application of these grounds for a retrial should cover
not just the civil judgements explicitly mentioned in the
norm, but also judgements under labour, social, admin-
istrative and financial law.52 If, on the other hand,
another criminal conviction utilised in the reaching of a
verdict is annulled, then the only possible path should
be via § 359 no. 5 StPO.53 However, if one assumes – as
holders of the prevailing opinion do – that a criminal
conviction is always ‘founded’ on the earlier decision in
the sense of § 359 no. 4 StPO if this decision was used as
documentary grounds, then it is not clear why this
should not also apply for earlier criminal convictions
which are introduced to the main proceedings by means
of public reading and utilised in the ruling.54 The same
applies against the prevailing opinion55 for the annul-
ment of administrative documents utilised in the crim-
inal conviction since the failure to obey state authority,
which still remains even after the elimination of an
unlawful administrative document, regularly does not
constitute any wrongdoing worthy of punishment.56
Notwithstanding the restrictive practical application
already mentioned, the retrial in favour of the convicted
on the grounds of the bringing of new facts or evidence
(§ 359 no. 5 StPO) has the greatest practical signifi-
cance.57 According to the regulation, designed as a gen-
eral clause,58 a retrial in favour of the convicted shall be
considered
Wrongful Convictions: Misplaced Priorities, Misconduct, Immunity and
Remedies’, in C. R. Huff and M. Killias (eds.), Wrongful Convictions &
Miscarriages of Justice (2013) 91; according to the National Registry of
Exonerations, ‘official misconduct’ contributed to the sentencing in
1,425 of the 2,647 cases recorded therein; cf.www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx;
accessed 23 June 2020, but may also constitute a not inconsiderable
factor in other legal systems – including the German system (cf. M. Kill-
ias and R. Huff, ‘Wrongful Convictions and Miscarriages of Justice:
What Did We Learn?’, in C. R. Huff & M. Killias (eds.), Wrongful Con-
victions & Miscarriages of Justice (2013) 373, at 380).
51. In the sense of Frister, above n. 7, § 359.26.
52. Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.15; Singelnstein, above n. 38, § 359.18;
Schmitt, above n. 6, § 359.17; dissent in Eschelbach, above n. 38,
§ 359.29.
53. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.33; Schmidt,
above n. 6, § 359.15; Schmitt, above n. 6, § 359.17.
54. For example, Frister, above n. 7, § 359.33; Kaspar, above n. 38,
§ 359.20.
55. Cf. BGHSt 23, 86 (94); Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.15; Schmitt, above
n. 6, § 359.17.
56. In the sense of Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.33;
Frister, above n. 7, § 359.34a; ultimately, also Kaspar, above n. 38,
§ 359.20; Singelnstein, above n. 38, § 359.18.
57. In the sense of Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.2;
Eschelbach, above n. 38, § 359.4; G. Strate, ‘Der Verteidiger in der
Wiederaufnahme’ [The Defence Counsel in Retrials], 19 Strafverteidiger
228, at 229 (1999).
58. Frister, above n. 7, § 359.35.
if new facts or evidence were produced which, inde-
pendently or in connection with the evidence previ-
ously taken, tend to support the defendant’s acquittal
or, upon application of a more lenient criminal provi-
sion, a lesser penalty or a fundamentally different
decision on a measure of reform and prevention.
(Maßregel der Besserung und Sicherung)
On the term (new) facts, the Federal Constitutional
Court states:
Facts shall be understood as existing, identifiable
occurrences or circumstances which belong to the
past or the present. Whether a fact is new or not shall
be judged solely according to whether or not the
court has already utilised it. Therefore, in principle
new is everything which the court has not taken as a
basis for forming its opinion, even if it could have
taken such as a basis.59
Therefore, in order to assess the question of whether a
fact is new, one must refer to the time of decision, mean-
ing the conclusion of deliberation in case of convic-
tions.60 Evidence discussed in the main proceedings
may also be new if the court (in violation of its obli-
gation to assess the evidence exhaustively and complete-
ly as arises from § 261 StPO)61 has not taken such as the
basis for its decision.62 It must be taken into account
though that criminal courts are not obliged to address
every taking of evidence made in the main proceedings
within the context of its grounds for the ruling.63 How-
ever, in the failure to mention a piece of evidence which
is substantial with respect to the basis of facts for the
decision, one may see an indication of a failure to take
such into account.64 Therefore, the sentence, facts are
‘not new (only) because they have not been mentioned
in the ruling’, which one finds in one of the leading
commentaries on the Criminal Procedural Code, does
not apply in this generality.65 So-called legal facts, such
as the repealing of a law or amendment to the interpre-
tation of such, are covered by § 359 no, 5 StPO just as
little as simple procedural errors or errors of substantive
law – the retrial is not a ‘review without time limit’.66
59. BVerfG, Resolution of the 2nd Chamber of the Second Senate of
19 July 2002 – 2 BvR 18/02, 2 BvR 76/02, StV 2003, 225.
60. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.45; Kaspar, above
n. 38, § 359.25; Marxen and Tiemann, above n. 38, n. 178.
61. See here Y. Ott and R. Hannich (ed.), Karlsruher Kommentar zur StPO
(8th edn, 2019), § 261.56 et seq.
62. In agreement, for example, Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34,
§ 359.44; Frister, above n. 7, § 359.46; Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.24;
alternative opinion, Schmitt, above n. 6, § 359.30.
63. Cf. Frister, above n. 7, § 359.47.
64. Ibid., § 359.47; differentiating, also Engländer and Zimmermann, above
n. 34, § 359.48; Eschelbach, above n. 38, § 359.161.
65. Schmitt, above n. 6, § 368.5; similarly, Singelnstein, above n. 38,
§ 359.27.
66. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 359.24; see also Frister, above n. 7, § 359.38;
Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.19; Singelnstein, above n. 38, § 359 Rn. 22;
for inclusion of facts of the case related to the proceedings, Engländer
and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.41; for extension to obvious
errors of law de lege ferenda, M.P. Waßmer, ‘Die Wiederaufnahme in
Strafsachen - Bestandsaufnahme und Reform’ [The Retrial in Criminal
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What is considered (new) evidence is the formal evid-
ence of the StPO (witnesses, experts, documents and
visual inspections), but not the defendant himself.67
Personal evidence means the persons themselves and
not their declarations; thus an amended statement is not
new evidence, but rather, under certain circumstances, a
new fact.68
According to § 359 no. 6 StPO, a retrial in favour of the
convicted shall ultimately be considered
if the European Court of Human Rights has asserted
a violation of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms or its protocols, and has based the ruling on
this violation.
The regulation takes account of the fact that decisions
adopted by the ECtHR do not have any direct cassatory
effect, and thus acts of law adjudged to be in contraven-
tion of the convention still require annulment by the
national courts.69 A requirement for a retrial according
to § 359 no. 6 StPO is that the criminal law sentence is
based on a violation of the Convention on Human Rights
or its protocols asserted by the ECtHR; however, here,
just as in the case of a review (§ 337 StPO),70 the possi-
bility alone that the decision would have been different
if the Convention had not been violated is sufficient.71
According to the wording of § 359 no. 6 StPO, which is
relevant in this respect, a retrial shall only be considered
if contravention of the Convention has been explicitly
asserted by the ECtHR; the analogous application to
contraventions of the Convention which are ‘clear’ but
not (yet) asserted by the ECtHR, which is sometimes72
advocated for, must be rejected.73 The same (in any case
de lege lata) applies for the carrying over of the result
contested by a convicted person before the ECtHR to
other cases of the same type; pursuant to § 359 no. 6
StPO, only persons who themselves have contested a
final decision before the ECtHR are permitted to make a
petition.74 It is an entirely different matter though
Cases – Survey and Reform], 24 Juristische Ausbildung 454, at 460
(2002).
67. Cf. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 359.27; Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.23. In
the opinion of Frister, above n. 7, § 359.36 this constitutes uniform
grounds for a retrial; the differentiation between facts and evidence is
obsolete.
68. Cf. Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.23; Singelnstein, above n. 38, § 359.22.
69. Cf. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 359.39.
70. On the requirement for a basis in the sense of § 337 StPO cf. only
Schmitt, above n. 6, § 337.37 with citations.
71. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.68; Frister, above
n. 7, § 359.74. The basis must be denied in particular if compensation
for a violation of the Convention has already been made in specialist
court proceedings.
72. For example, from County Court Ravensburg, Resolution of 4 Sep-
tember 2000 – 1 Qs 169/00, NStZ-RR 2001, 115.
73. Cf. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 359.40; Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.40.
74. Cf. Eschelbach, above n. 38, § 359.219; Frister, above n. 7, § 359.75;
Schmidt, above n. 6, § 359.40; Schmitt, above n. 6, § 359.52; con-
versely, for extension of the applicable § 359 no. 6 StPO to parallel
cases Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.69; R. Esser, ‘Die
Umsetzung der Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschen-
rechte im nationalen Recht – ein Beispiel für die Dissonanz völkerrecht-
licher Verpflichtungen und verfassungsrechtlicher Vorgaben?’ [Imple-
whether this restriction is still appropriate – in fact,
there are good reasons to call for an extension of the
grounds for retrial to sentences which are based on a
legal norm or legal opinion declared in another case to be
in contravention of the Convention is demanded de lege
ferenda.75
Thus, the legal situation with respect to decisions of the
ECtHR would ultimately be adapted to the legal situ-
ation which applies for decisions of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court pursuant to § 79(1) BVerfGG. According
to this regulation, a retrial is permitted against any crim-
inal conviction
based on a legal provision which was declared to be
incompatible with the Grundgesetz or which was voi-
ded pursuant to § 78, or which was based on the
interpretation of a legal provision which the Federal
Constitutional Court declared to be incompatible
with the Grundgesetz.
Insofar as the law also requires that a decision here be
based on the unconstitutional norm or interpretation of
the norm, again the standard developed for review
according to § 337 StPO should be used.76
3.1.3 Grounds for a Retrial to the Disadvantage of the
Defendant
The grounds for a retrial to the disadvantage of the
defendant standardised under § 362 nos. 1 to 3 StPO
largely correspond in content to the grounds stipulated
for a retrial in favour of the convicted under § 359 nos. 1
to 3 StPO. In principle, one can refer to the discussions
on these in this regard. However, unlike § 359 no. 3
StPO, the fact that the defendant has caused the crim-
inal violation of public duty is not given any significance
in the context of § 362 no. 3 StPO.77 And unlike § 359
StPO, an extension of the scope of application of the
grounds for retrial by analogy is otherwise rejected on
the grounds of the principle of ne bis in idem anchored
constitutionally in § 103(3) GG.78
§ 362 StPO does not contain any grounds for a retrial
which correspond to those contained in § 359 no. 4
StPO (annulment of a civil law decision). Conversely,
the grounds for retrial standardised in § 362 no. 4 StPO,
mentation of Rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in
National Law – An Example of Dissonance between Public International
Law Obligations and Constitutional Law Stipulations?], 25 Strafvertei-
diger 348, at 354-5 (2005); T. Weigend, ‘Die Europäische Menschen-
rechtskonvention als deutsches Recht – Kollisionen und ihre Lösung’
[The European Convention on Human Rights as German Law – Con-
flicts and How to Solve Them], 20 Strafverteidiger 384, at 388 (2000).
75. In the sense of Frister, above n. 7, § 359.75a; Kaspar, above n. 38,
§ 359.42; M. Marxen, ‘Ende gut, aber keineswegs alles gut – Defizite
des strafrechtlichen Wiederaufnahmeverfahrens’ [Good in the End but
Far from All Good – Shortcomings in the Retrial Procedure under Crim-
inal Law], in P.-A. Albrecht, et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Walter Kargl
[Festschrift for Walter Kargl] (2015) 323, at 331.
76. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 359.81.
77. Cf. Singelnstein, above n. 38, § 362.4.
78. This applies, for example, for the analogous application of § 359 no. 1
StPO to technical recordings in the sense of § 268 StGB that is
sometimes considered (cf. substantiation of the current debate in
fn. 40). As a whole, see Kaspar, above n. 38, § 362.4.
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namely the giving of a believable confession (obviously),
have no counterpart in § 359 StPO. According to § 362
no. 4 StPO, a retrial to the disadvantage of the defend-
ant shall be considered ‘if a credible confession to the
criminal act is given by the acquitted party in or outside
the court’. To establish theses grounds for a retrial, it
was crucial to assume that
the people’s legal consciousness (could) be misled if a
criminal, after being acquitted due to a lack of evid-
ence, may accuse himself or even boast of the crime
without punishment.79
Here too, the limited wording must be strictly observed;
since it talks of the ‘acquitted’, application to confessed
convicts with the aim of a harsher penalty cannot be con-
sidered.80 Insofar as a measure of reform and prevention
(which is not connected with an accusation of guilt) was
imposed according to § 61 et seq. StGB alongside an
acquittal, this does not prevent a retrial.81 According to
the wording of the norm, the confession must further-
more come personally from the acquitted person named
in the petition for retrial; testimonial confessions of pur-
ported accessories to the act are not sufficient.82 If one
takes the requirement for a ‘confession to a criminal act’
seriously, then one must also demand that the presence
of all prerequisites for criminal liability (including
unlawfulness and guilt) arises a priori from the state-
ment of the acquitted; the rationale of the norm also
speaks in favour of this.83 The prevailing opinion, how-
ever, considers it sufficient that the defendant ‘admits to
the external facts of the case and his perpetration there-
of’.84 Ultimately, the confession must be ‘credible’
according to § 362 no. 4 StPO; this is interpreted to the
effect that the facts admitted to are logically possible in
law and must correspond to lived experience.85
3.2 Procedure
The following section is devoted to a presentation of the
retrial procedure. The procedure is broken down into a
review of the permissibility and merit of the petition,
and in the case of a merited petition ends in a repeating
of the main proceedings.86
79. Draft 1873, Reasoning of § 278, clause 174; cited in Frister, above n. 7,
§ 362.1.
80. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 362.11; Frister, above
n. 7, § 362.14; Schmidt, above n. 6, § 362.9.
81. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 362.12; Frister, above
n. 7, § 362.15.
82. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 362.13.
83. See here ibid.; Frister, above n. 7, § 362.16; Kaspar, above n. 38,
§ 362.10.
84. Schmidt, above n. 6, § 362.11; also Schmitt, above n. 6, § 362.5; each
with citations.
85. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 362.16; Schmidt,
above n. 6, § 362.14; see also Frister, above n. 7, § 362.18, who more-
over demands an overwhelming likelihood of sentencing in the sense of
the suspicion of an offence otherwise duly sufficient for the lodging of
an appeal and opening of the main proceedings (§ 170(1), § 203
StPO).
86. Cf. here also the overview in Bayer, above n. 3, at 168 et seq. A com-
prehensive illustration of the review of permissibility and merit can be
found in Marxen and Tiemann, above n. 38, n. 11 et seq.
3.2.1 Review of the Permissibility of the Petition for
Retrial (Additionsverfahren)
The so-called Additionsverfahren (lit. additions process),
in which the permissibility of a petition for a retrial is
reviewed, is essentially governed under § 366 et seq.
StPO. Many petitions for a retrial in favour of the con-
victed obviously fail at this stage in the procedure; the
reason for this is (also) found in a generally restrictive
handling of the relevant regulations by the courts who
are not necessarily open to a critical review of their deci-
sions.87
Pursuant to § 366(1) StPO, ‘the statutory ground for
reopening proceedings and the evidence’ must be speci-
fied in the petition – which is not subject to a time lim-
it.88 The petition for a retrial may only be based on the
presence of one of the legally standardised grounds for
retrial; it is impermissible if it is aimed exclusively at
effecting a different sentencing on the grounds of the
same law or a reduction in sentence due to significantly
reduced criminal responsibility (§ 21 StGB; cf. § 363(1),
(2) StPO).89
If the defendant (or a close member of his family in case
of his death, § 361(2) StPO) is seeking a retrial in his
favour, then he may bring the ‘application only in the
form of a written document signed by defence counsel
or by a lawyer, or orally to be recorded by the court reg-
istry’ (§ 366(2) StPO).90 Whilst the finding of a special-
ist lawyer who is in principle willing to take on the man-
date of a retrial should not be an insurmountable obsta-
cle, the financing of the mandate from the defendant’s
own resources often poses significant and not infre-
quently insurmountable obstacles to an effectively con-
victed person.91 Under certain conditions, therefore, the
appointing of counsel is stipulated for the retrial proce-
dure or upon preparations for such (§ 364a,b StPO).
The latter is then the case pursuant, inter alia, to
§ 364b(1)(1) no. 1 StPO if ‘there are sufficient factual
indications that making certain inquiries will bring to
light facts or evidence which may substantiate the
admissibility of an application to reopen the proceed-
ings’. Counsel is thus authorised to undertake investiga-
87. Cf. M. Bock et al., ‘Die erneute Wiederaufnahme des Strafverfahrens’
[The Retrying of Criminal Proceedings], 160 Goltdammer’s Archiv für
Strafrecht 328 (2013); R. Eschelbach, A. Geipel, M. Hettinger, L. Meller
& F. Wille, ‘Plädoyer gegen die Abschaffung der Wiederaufnahme des
Strafverfahrens’ [Against the Elimination of the Retrying of Criminal
Proceedings], 165 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht 238 (2018); Fris-
ter and Müller, above n. 7, at 104; Marxen, above n. 75, at 323; Marx-
en and Tiemann, above n. 38, n. 2; Strate, above n. 57, at 228.
88. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 366.19; see also Marx-
en and Tiemann, above n. 38, n. 14, who rightly point out that a practi-
cal restriction arises from the fact that the bringing of new evidence
gets harder and harder over time.
89. For the striking of § 363(2) StPO de lege ferenda, Frister, above n. 7,
§ 363.21-22: Frister and Müller, above n. 7, at 104; for criticism, also
J. Kaspar and C. Arnemann, ‘Die Wiederaufnahme des Strafverfahrens
zur Korrektur fehlerhafter Urteile’ [The Retrying of Criminal Proceedings
to Correct Wrongful Rulings], 34 Recht & Psychiatrie 58, at 63 (2016).
90. Cf. here Roxin and Schünemann, above n. 5, § 57.13. Here, in the case
of signing by a lawyer, it is required that said lawyer assumes full
responsibility for the content, and has been involved in its creation;
cf. Kaspar, above n. 38.
91. See here also Strate, above n. 57, at 228.
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tions independently (such as questioning witnesses), but
of course in doing so does not have the coercive powers
which are available to the criminal investigation authori-
ties.92 Pursuant to § 364b(1)(1) no. 3 StPO, counsel shall
also be appointed if ‘the convicted person is unable to
hire counsel at his own costs without impairing the sup-
port which he and his family require’. For the event of
appointment according to § 364b(1)(1) StPO, § 45(4)(1)
German Act on Remuneration of Lawyers (Rechtsan-
waltsvergütungsgesetz; RVG) stipulates that the lawyer
appointed shall have a claim against the state treasury
even if he ultimately advises against the lodging of a
petition for retrial; according to § 46(3)(1) RVG, this
claim to remuneration also covers expenses which are
incurred due to the investigations undertaken regarding
preparation for the retrial procedure.93 In quite general
terms, the legislator, with § 364a,b StPO, takes account
of the fact that many (in particular incarcerated) convic-
ted persons are personally unable or able only to a very
limited extent to exercise their rights competently in
advance of the retrial procedure and during execution of
such.94
The authority of the court is governed by special provi-
sions of the German Judicature Act (Gerichtsverfassungs-
gesetz; GVG; § 367(1)(1) StPO). Pursuant to § 140a(1)
(1) GVG, the petition for retrial is decided on by
‘another court with the same substantive jurisdiction as
the court against whose decision the application for the
reopening of proceedings is directed’. Pursuant to
§ 368(1) StPO, this court shall review whether the for-
mal requirements have been adhered to, whether legally
stipulated grounds for retrial have been asserted and
whether suitable evidence has been indicated. If any of
these conditions of permissibility is lacking, then the
petition is rejected by the court as impermissible.
The requirements that must be placed on the suitability
of evidence required by § 368(1) StPO are contested at
this stage in the procedure. This debate is significant
above all for the assessment of a petition for retrial based
on § 359 no. 5 StPO.95 According to the appropriate
interpretation, those criteria which are followed in the
assessment of petitions to take evidence in contentious
proceedings (cf. § 244(3)-(5) StPO) shall be taken as a
basis here.96 Accordingly, evidence shall also be consid-
ered unsuitable in the sense of § 368(1) StPO if the tak-
ing of evidence is not possible in a legally permissible
92. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 364b.6; Marxen and
Tiemann, above n. 38, n. 462-463. An overview of ‘research material
and tools of the defence counsel’ can be found in Strate, above n. 57,
at 233-4. The author – himself a highly experienced defence lawyer,
including in retrial procedures – points out that in the light of the lack of
coercive powers, the defence is reliant on showing potential interlocu-
tors the meaningfulness of the request for retrial. Moreover, he high-
lights opportunities for making use of specialist expertise.
93. More details on the effects of appointment under the law on fees, Eng-
länder and Zimmermann, above n. 34.
94. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 364a.1.
95. A comprehensive overview of the current debate can be found in Arne-
mann, above n. 3, at 397 et seq.
96. In the sense of Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 368.14;
Eschelbach, above n. 38, § 368.31; Frister, above n. 7, § 368.11; Kas-
par, above n. 38, § 368.7; conversely Schmidt, above n. 6, § 368.10.
manner, if the evidence is unattainable for the court or if
the evidence must be considered wholly unsuitable from
the outset.97 The latter is the case if it can be asserted,
without any consideration for the previous result of the
evidence, that the result promised with the evidence
offered cannot be attained according to concrete lived
experience.98 Whilst some of the literature wishes to
apply this restrictive standard exclusively,99 the prevail-
ing opinion permits a further evaluation of the probative
force of the new evidence and – within certain limits –
an anticipation of the consideration of the evidence in
the additional process itself.100 Critics see in this a key
reason for the low rate of success of petitions for retrial
based on § 359 no. 5 StPO.101 According to the prevail-
ing opinion, the principle of in dubio pro reo should also
not apply otherwise in this regard since the court does
not have to be convinced by the new bringing of facts,
but rather simply makes a predictive decision.102
A permissible petition shall be presented to the complai-
nant’s counterparty – meaning the Public Prosecutor’s
Office in the case of a petition by a convicted person –
‘with a time limit being set for a response’ (§ 368(2)
StPO). The preferred interpretation sees in this a rule
for granting a legal hearing before the giving of a deci-
sion of permissibility (not legally governed in more
detail);103 the still prevailing opinion, on the other hand,
assumes that § 368(2) StPO refers to the provision of the
decision of permissibility to the counterparty, with the
result that only the Public Prosecutor’s Office must be
heard before the giving of the decision according to
§ 33(2) StPO.104
3.2.2 Review of the Merit of the Petition for Retrial
(Probationsverfahren)
With the decision to approve the petition, the Additions-
verfahren moves on to the so-called Probationsverfahren
97. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 368.14; Frister, above n. 7,
§ 368.11.
98. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 368.14.
99. Eschelbach, above n. 38, § 368.31; Kaspar, above n. 38, § 368.7.
100. Cf. BGHSt 17, 303 (304); BGH, Resolution of 22 October 1999 – 3 StE
15/93-1 – StB 4/99, NStZ 2000, 218; Engländer and Zimmermann,
above n. 34, § 368.31; Schmidt, above n. 6, § 368.10. However,
according to the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court,
‘the assertion of such facts which greatly support the verdict of guilty,
in that they demarcate the adjudged act in its crucial characteristics, or
the confirmation or presentation of which play a predominant role in
the defence of the defendant, must in any case be reserved for the
main proceedings’ (BVerfG, Resolution of the 2nd Chamber of the Sec-
ond Senate of 7 September 1994 – 2 BvR 2093/93, NJW 1995, 2024,
2025).
101. According to Marxen and Tiemann, above n. 38, n. 199, the ‘character-
istic of suitability [is] of the greatest practical importance. Lack of suita-
bility is in practice the most frequently applied grounds for rejection’.
102. K. Volk and A. Engländer, Grundkurs StPO [A Basic Course in the StPO]
(9th edn, 2018), § 38.19; see also BGHSt 39, 75 (85); Schmidt, above
n. 6, § 368.13; criticism in B. Schünemann, ‘Das strafprozessuale Wie-
deraufnahmeverfahren propter nova und der Grundsatz ‘in dubio pro
reo’’ [The Criminal Law Procedure of the Retrial propter nova and the
Principle of ‘in dubio pro reo’], 84 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Straf-
rechtswissenschaft 870, at 889 et seq. (1972).
103. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 368.54; Frister, above n. 7,
§ 368.12.
104. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 368.13; Schmitt, above n. 6, § 368.13.
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(hearing of the petition), in which a decision is reached
regarding the merit of the petition for retrial.
Pursuant to § 369(1) StPO, the taking of evidence shall
be performed by a judge appointed by the retrial court.
This formulation must not be understood in the techni-
cal sense; rather, as well as petitioning another judge in
the sense of § 156 et seq. GVG, a taking of evidence by
members or the whole of the panel of judges which has
jurisdiction according to § 140a GVG shall also be con-
sidered.105 Conversely, evidence obtained exclusively by
the police or the Public Prosecutor’s Office is unusa-
ble.106 According to popular opinion, the principle of
the inquisitorial system (Amtsermittlung; § 244(2) StPO)
has to be applied accordingly in the Probationsverfahren;
the collecting of evidence shall consequently be exten-
ded to all facts which are of significance for the retrial ex
officio.107 By some scholars, however, only a power, not
an obligation, to extend the taking of evidence to addi-
tional evidence is assumed.108 However, the wording of
§ 369(1) StPO, which speaks of the ‘taking of the evid-
ence adduced’ (our emphasis), and the structure of the
retrial process aimed at the principle of party disposition
speak in favour of limiting the taking of evidence, in the
preferable opposing opinion, to the evidence indicated
by the complainant.109 However, from the claim to a fair
and due process of law, there follows an obligation of
the court to exhaustively utilise the evidence indicated
by the complainant, and to direct queries to an expert,
for example.110 If witnesses or experts are questioned, or
if the court undertakes a physical inspection, then the
Public Prosecutor’s Office, the defendant, and counsel
have a right to be present (§ 369(3)(1)StPO).
After the taking of evidence is completed, the defendant
and the Public Prosecutor’s Office shall be given an
opportunity to submit an opinion (§ 369(4) StPO). If the
claims made in the petition have ‘not [been] sufficiently
substantiated’, then the petition is rejected as unfoun-
ded without oral proceedings pursuant to § 370(1)
StPO; the same applies according to this regulation if, in
the case of a petition for retrial based on a document
offence or the false statement of a witness or expert pur-
suant to § 359 nos. 1, 2 or § 362 nos. 1, 2 StPO, ‘the
assumption that the act specified in these provisions
105. Cf. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 369.3; Schmidt, above n. 6, § 369.6.
106. Kaspar, above n. 38, § 369.4; Marxen and Tiemann, above n. 38,
n. 366.
107. Higher County Court Zweibrücken, Resolution of 1 February 1993 – 1
Ws 432/92, Goltdammer’s Archiv 1993, 463 (465); Higher County
Court Hamburg, Resolution of 17 July 2000 – 1 Ws 53/00, Strafvertei-
diger 2003, 229; Kaspar, above n. 38, § 369.2; Roxin and Schünemann,
above n. 5, § 57.15; Schmitt, above n. 6, § 369.5.
108. Cf. Schmidt, above n. 6, § 369.2.
109. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 369.9 et seq.; Eschel-
bach, above n. 38, § 369.2 et seq.; Frister, above n. 7, § 369.8 et seq.;
Marxen and Tiemann, above n. 38, n. 370.
110. Frister, above n. 7, § 369.8 under reference to BVerfG, Resolution of
the 2nd Chamber of the Second Senate of 23 December 2002 – 2 BvR
1439/02, Strafverteidiger 2003, 223 (224). As Frister (ibid n. 10) makes
clear, the emphasis the prevailing opinion puts on the obligation to pur-
sue the inquisitorial system may be derived from efforts ‘to undertake
significant parts of a taking of evidence reserved for the main proceed-
ings during the Probationsverfahren itself, and where applicable to
assert insufficient confirmation of the bringing of the retrial’.
influenced the decision can be ruled out given the
circumstances which pertain’. The rejection of the peti-
tion as impermissible is subject to immediate appeal
(§ 372, clause 1 StPO).
However, when a claim can be assumed to be ‘suffi-
ciently substantiated’ in the sense of § 370(1) StPO has
been contested in detail.111 By some authors, the suffi-
cient likelihood of a more favourable decision for the
complainant in the new main proceedings is demanded
in this context without further differentiation.112 How-
ever, the correct approach is to differentiate between the
grounds for retrial.113 Thus, for those grounds which
are associated with criminal behaviour (§ 359, nos. 1-3,
§ 362, nos. 1-3 StPO), the full conviction of the court
that there exists a criminal act is required, insofar as a
retrial, by way of exception, is permissible without a
legally effective sentence pursuant to § 364, clause 1
(2nd alternative).114 For a retrial on the grounds of a
believable confession by the acquitted person (§ 362, no.
4 StPO), the level of suspicion necessary to initiate the
main proceedings pursuant to § 203 StPO is crucial.115
With respect to a retrial in favour of the defendant on
the grounds of new facts or evidence (§ 359, no. 5
StPO), the prevailing opinion demands sufficient likeli-
hood of a retrial being brought,116 whilst in one minority
opinion the mere possibility of correctness should suf-
fice.117
If the petition is well-founded, then ‘the court shall
order the reopening of the proceedings and the recom-
mencement of the main hearing’ (§ 370(2) StPO). This
resolution has far-reaching significance; it nullifies the
substantive legal force and enforceability of the first rul-
ing.118
3.2.3 Reopening the Main Proceedings
The new main proceedings to be held on the grounds of
a successful petition for retrial are independent of the
proceedings, in which the first ruling was made; in these
proceedings, ‘the set of evidence must be completely
rebuilt from scratch’.119 The end result – just as in any
other main criminal proceedings – may be a sentencing,
an acquittal or a suspension of proceedings. However, a
prohibition on reformatio in peius applies; i.e.
the original judgment, so far as it relates to the type
and degree of the legal consequences of the offence,
111. For an overview of the current debate, cf. Engländer and Zimmermann,
above n. 34, § 370.6 et seq.
112. Cf. Schmidt, above n. 6, § 370.4; Volk and Engländer, above n. 102,
§ 38.20.
113. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 370.6; Frister, above
n. 7, § 370.4.
114. This relates to cases where ‘criminal proceedings cannot be commenced
or conducted for reasons other than lack of evidence’. Cf. Engländer
and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 370.8; Frister, above n. 7, § 370.4.
115. Cf. Frister, above n. 7, § 370.5; Schmidt, above n. 6, § 370.4.
116. Cf. Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 370.10, 14; Schmitt,
above n. 6, § 370.4.
117. Cf. Schünemann, above n. 102, at 898; in substance, also Frister, above
n. 7, § 370.13.
118. Cf. Roxin and Schünemann, above n. 5, § 57.16; in detail, see Engländ-
er and Zimmermann, above n. 34, § 370.19 et seq.
119. Roxin and Schünemann, above n. 5, § 57.17.
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may not be amended to the convicted person’s detri-
ment if only the defendant or, on his behalf the
public prosecution office, or his statutory representa-
tive applied to reopen the proceedings. (§ 373(2)(1)
StPO)
However, orders to place the defendant in a psychiatric
hospital or in an addiction treatment facility may be
instructed for the first time (§ 373(2)(2) StPO).120 An
acquittal can also be made without reopening the main
proceedings if the convicted person dies (§ 371(1)
StPO), or if there exists sufficient evidence for an
acquittal and the Public Prosecutor’s Office consents
(§ 371(2) StPO).
3.2.4 Damage Compensation for Wrongfully Prosecuted
Persons
In the event of a successful retrial in favour of the con-
victed person, he shall in principle have a right to dam-
age compensation for the disadvantages suffered as a
result of the sentence according to the German Act on
Damage Compensation for the Wrongfully Prosecuted
(Strafverfolgungsentschädigungsgesetz; StrEG).121 Accor-
ding to § 7(3) StrEG, compensation for damages which
are not pecuniary in nature is just 25 euros per started
day of detention.122 According to a draft bill approved
by the German Bundesrat (Federal Council) in Decem-
ber 2019, this amount should henceforth be set at 75
euros.123 It should be noted that compensation pursuant
to § 5(2)(1) StrEG is excluded ‘if and insofar as the
accused has caused the criminal prosecution by means
of wilful intent or gross negligence’.124
4 Legal Reality of the Retrial
Process
No official statistics are kept regarding successful retrial
processes in Germany; the actual number of judicial
errors is therefore primarily the subject of more or less
well-founded estimates by legal practitioners and jour-
120. This possibility is the consequence of the duality of the German criminal
sanctions system. For details, see M. Lindemann, ‘Die Zweispurigkeit
des deutschen Sanktionensystems – rechtliche Grundlagen und Konse-
quenzen für die Vollzugsgestaltung’ [The Duality of the German Crim-
inal Sanctions System – Legal Basics and Consequences for the Nature
of Enforcement], 68 Forum Strafvollzug 99 (2019).
121. See here F. Leuschner and A. Hoffmann, ‘Der Umgang des Staates mit
Fehlern der Justiz’ [The State’s Handling of Errors of Justice], 28 Neue
Kriminalpolitik 155 (2016).
122. Criticism, see Marxen, above n. 75, at 323.
123. Draft of an … Act to Amend the Act on Damage Compensation for the
Wrongfully Prosecuted (StrEG), BT-Drs. 19/17035. In its meeting of
1 July 2020, the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and Con-
sumer Protection of the German Bundestag recommended the adoption
of the proposal; see BT-Drs. 19/20659.
124. However, the claim to damage compensation is ‘not excluded by the
fact that the defendant has limited himself to a statement on the case
only, or by the fact that he has omitted to lodge an appeal’ (§ 5(2)(2)
StrEG).
nalists.125 However, alongside the substantial work of K.
Peters from the 1970s, there are also a few newer empir-
ical studies devoted to the subject, which are discussed
below.126 A joint interdisciplinary project on the issue of
‘Errors and retrials in the criminal process’, funded by
the German research funding organisation Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, promises significant gains in
knowledge, although it is not scheduled to be completed
until March 2022.127 According to data from the Ger-
man Federal Office of Statistics (Statistisches Bunde-
samt), in 2018 a total of 325 proceedings held before dis-
trict (Amtsgericht) and county courts (Landgericht) were
initiated by a petition for a retrial to the disadvantage of
the defendant, and a total of 1,000 by a petition for a
retrial in favour of the convicted.128 However, as already
mentioned above, data on the success of these petitions
for retrial cannot be obtained from these statistics.
Amongst the studies presented in the recent past with a
focus on the right to a retrial, mention must be made of
a study carried out at the Kriminologische Zentralstelle
(KrimZ) in Wiesbaden, which is based on an in-depth
analysis of successful retrial processes.129 The study
supposedly involved all persons who were wrongfully
(as evidenced by a successful retrial) given a prison sen-
tence between 1990 and 2016. Ultimately, the files of 29
proceedings affecting 31 convicted persons were evalu-
ated; the files for a further six proceedings were no
125. Evidence in S. Barton, M. Dubelaar, R. Kölbel & M. Lindemann (eds.),
‘Vom hochgemuten, voreiligen Griff nach der Wahrheit…’ Fehlurteile
im Strafprozess [‘On the Energetic, Rushed Search for the Truth…’
Judicial Errors in the Criminal Process] (2018) 9, at 13-14. Estimates of
the prevalence of judicial errors range from the low single figures to
10% or even 25%.
126. K. Peters, Fehlerquellen im Strafprozeß, Bände 1-3 [Sources of Errors in
the Criminal Process, vols 1-3] (1970-1974). Regarding larger, mostly
older empirical studies, cf. the overview in Arnemann, above n. 3, at
186 et seq. For an overview of the latest research, cf. also B. Dunkel
and S. Kemme, ‘Fehlurteile in Deutschland: eine Bilanz der empirischen
Forschung seit fünf Jahrzehnten’ [Judicial Errors in Germany: A Review
of Five Decades of Empirical Research], 28 Neue Kriminalpolitik 138
(2016).
127. Involved in the project are Kriminologische Forschungsinstitut Nieder-
sachsen e.V. (Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony) (Prof
Thomas Bliesener), the Heinrich-Heine University Düsseldorf (Prof Kars-
ten Altenhain) und die Psychologische Hochschule Berlin (Berlin Psycho-
logical University) (Prof Renate Volbert). More information can be
found on the project homepage; cf.https://kfn.de/forschungsprojekte/
fehler-und-wiederaufnahme-im-strafverfahren/ (accessed on 26 July
2020).
128. Statistisches Bundesamt (eds.), Rechtspflege Strafgerichte Fachserie 10
Reihe 2.3 [Administration of Justice in Criminal Courts Special Series 10
Vol 2.3] (2019); accessible online at https://tinyurl.com/y54x5bda
(accessed on 26 July 2020). B. Dunkel conducts a time-series analysis
on these data in Fehlentscheidungen in der Justiz. Systematische Ana-
lyse von Wiederaufnahmeverfahren in Strafverfahren im Hinblick auf
Häufigkeit und Risikofaktoren [Wrongful Decisions in the Justice
System. A Systematic Analysis of Retrial Procedures in Criminal Pro-
ceedings with respect to Frequency and Risk Factors] (2018), at 156 et
seq.
129. Some of these results have also been published in English; cf. F. Leusch-
ner, M. Rettenberger & A. Dessecker, ‘Imprisoned But Innocent:
Wrongful Convictions and Imprisonments in Germany, 1990-2016’, 66
Crime & Delinquency 687 (2020). More details in A. Hoffmann and
F. Leuschner, Rehabilitation und Entschädigung nach Vollstreckung
einer Freiheitsstrafe und erfolgreicher Wiederaufnahme [Rehabilitation
and Damage Compensation after Imposition of a Prison Sentence and
Successful Retrial] (2017).
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longer available.130 The overwhelming majority of per-
sons affected had been convicted of sexual offences
(38.7%) or serious violent offences (35.5%).131 The
reasons for these judicial errors were predominantly
false accusations (N = 12) and incorrect evidence from
expert witnesses (12); other frequent reasons were (a
failure to recognise) lack of criminal liability (8), misi-
dentification by eye witnesses (5) and false confessions
(5).132 As part of the overall project, questions sur-
rounding rehabilitation and damage compensation after
a successful retrial were also investigated in detail; to do
this, 17 interviews were carried out in addition to the
file analysis with affected persons and professional
actors in the criminal proceedings.133 It was shown here
that there is still a significant need for improvement in
terms of the economic and social reintegration of per-
sons who have previously been wrongfully incarcer-
ated.134
B. Dunkel presented an analysis of retrial files based on
petitions for retrial submitted to the courts in the
Hanseatic City of Hamburg between 2003 and 2015.135
As a result, she was able to include 48 files in the inves-
tigation; of those, 44 were in favour of the convicted,
and 4 to the disadvantage of the defendant.136 56% of
the retrials related to penalty orders pursuant to § 407 et
seq. StPO.137 Since this study, unlike the KrimZ study,
did not restrict itself to convicted persons who had been
wrongfully given a detention sentence (the proportion of
financial penalties was 66.7%), the deviation in distribu-
tion of types of offence is not surprising: here, theft and
robbery (25.0%), fraud (20.8%) and highway offences
(10.4%) dominated.138 60.5% of proceedings before the
District Court were successful; before the County
Court, this figure was only 22.2%.139 The reasons for
130. A comprehensive description of the methodology can be found in
Leuschner, Rettenberger & Dessecker, above n. 129, at 694 et seq.
131. Cf. Leuschner, Rettenberger & Dessecker, above n. 129, at 697.
132. Ibid., at 701.
133. Cf. Hoffmann and Leuschner, above n. 129, at 34 et seq.
134. Ibid., at 58 et seq.
135. Cf. Dunkel, above n. 128, at 169 et seq.
136. On methodology, cf. Dunkel, above n. 128, at 170 et seq.; on distribu-
tion of aims of retrial cf. ibid, at 184.
137. Cf. Dunkel, above n. 128, at 180. On the particularities of the penalty
order process, cf. above n. 31. It must be assumed that this process,
held in writing, is not particularly well suited to identifying particularities
lying in the person of the defendant (such as diminished responsibility in
the sense of § 20 StGB), and that many defendants are overwhelmed
by the formalities of the criminal process, such that a not insignificant
number of penalty orders become legally effective without there having
been any real opportunities for defence by means of an objection. For
an in-depth analysis of the susceptibility of the penalty order process to
error from the Swiss perspective, cf. G. Gilliéron, ‘Fallstricke für die
Wahrheitsfindung in summarischen Verfahren’ [Pitfalls for Establish-
ment of the Truth in Summary Proceedings], in S. Barton, M. Dubelaar,
R. Kölbel & M. Lindemann (eds.), ‘Vom hochgemuten, voreiligen Griff
nach der Wahrheit…’’ Fehlurteile im Strafprozess (2018) 59, at 68 et
seq.
138. Cf. Dunkel, above n. 128, at 181.
139. Ibid., at 188. According to Dunkel, one explanation for this difference
could be that in proceedings before the Country Court which regularly
deal with more serious allegations, the preliminary investigation and the
taking of evidence in the main hearing are conducted more carefully.
Perhaps, however, the decisions of the Country Court are simply met
with more trust.
the first ruling being wrongful were dominated by fail-
ure to observe a psychological condition (N = 12) and a
lack of or wrongly collected evidence (8).140
As part of her investigation into ‘Shortcoming(s) in ret-
rying criminal cases’, C. Arnemann conducted guided
interviews with 13 specialist criminal defence lawyers.141
The results of the work are largely impossible to sum-
marise due to the qualitative approach underlying it;142
however, it is nevertheless significant that the prospect
for success of retrials is considered by the criminal
defence lawyers to be extremely small:
Retrial is not a functioning legal remedy, it’s an illu-
sory area of law. It’s only successful in extremely
exceptional cases. The whole of retrial law is just
about blocking. Therefore, most clients have to be
advised against a petition for retrial in the opinion of
the experts questioned.143
The work also contains statements on the regional
differences in the frequency of petitions for retrial
which are clear from the legal statistics:
Regional differences in how courts handle retrial pro-
cesses were not reported. The fluctuating number of
petitions for retrial between different German Bun-
desländer can be traced back to the engagement and
specialisation of the defence lawyers. For example,
more engaged criminal defence lawyers are located in
large cities. The criminal defence lawyer located in a
rural area lacks the experience, and the opportunity
to discuss the case with colleagues, and also access to
specialist libraries.144
A key problem mentioned is that the courts de facto
organised the review of permissibility as a review of
merit, meaning that many petitions for retrial failed in
the Additionsverfahren itself.145
5 Current Developments in
Legal Policy
In the past, it was above all the principled exclusion of a
retrial to the disadvantage of the defendant in the case of
the bringing of new facts or evidence (on the limited
exception for penalty order proceedings, cf. § 373a(1)
StPO) that was repeatedly the subject of political initia-
tives.146 Examples of this include the draft of a bill on
reforming the right to a retrial under criminal law intro-
duced by the Bundesrat in 2008 at the initiative of the
Bundesländer of Hamburg and Nordrhein-Westfalen.
140. Cf. Dunkel, above n. 128, at 191.
141. Cf. Arnemann, above n. 3, at 216 et seq.
142. On methodology, ibid., at 217 et seq.
143. Cf. Arnemann, above n. 3, at 270-1.
144. Ibid., at 271.
145. Ibid., at 276. Cf. on this issue also Frister, above n. 7, § 369.10.
146. For an overview of previous legislative initiatives to be recorded,
cf. Arnemann, above n. 3, at 172 et seq.
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According to the plans of the draft’s authors, a no. 5 was
to be added to § 362 StPO, which would then have also
allowed a retrial to the disadvantage of the defendant
if new facts or evidence, which alone or in connection
with evidence previously collected are liable to con-
vict the acquitted person, and which were not
available at the time of making the ruling, in which
the assertions underlying the ruling were last
reviewed, are brought on the grounds of new scientif-
ically recognised, technical investigation methods.147
What was primarily meant in this regard was technical
progress in the area of DNA analysis.148 The new
opportunity for retrial to be created as a result was to
remain limited to acquittals regarding accusations of
murder and only homicide crimes potentially subject to
a sentence of life imprisonment according to the Ger-
man Code of Crimes against International Law (Völker-
strafgesetzbuch; VStGB),149 as well as incitement to such
crimes which are punished with life imprisonment.150
Following a hearing of experts before the German Par-
liamentary Committee of Legal Affairs (Rechtsausschuss),
the proposal was abandoned on the grounds of constitu-
tional reservations.151 A draft largely identical in con-
tent, which can be traced back to Nordrhein-Westfalen,
from 2010152 was also unsuccessful.
This notwithstanding, the Coalition Agreement of the
German Grand Coalition for the current legislative
period contains the following declaration of intent: ‘We
shall expand the opportunities for retrial to the
disadvantage of the acquitted defendant with respect to
criminal acts with no statute of limitations’.153 The con-
siderable media attention which certain spectacular judi-
cial errors have gained in the recent past154 may have
contributed to a broad majority of German citizens
being not opposed to a corresponding expansion of
147. BT-Drs. 16/7957, at 5.
148. Cf. Ibid., at 1: ‘Countless examples from previous years show that even
in the case of capital offences that have not yet been resolved, it is still
possible to convict the perpetrator several years later. DNA analysis in
particular delivers scientifically objective results which allow one to
prove the act unambiguously’. Criticism here in K. Marxen and F. Tie-
mann, ‘Aus Wissenschaft und Praxis: Die geplante Reform der Wieder-
aufnahme zuungunsten des Angeklagten’ [From Theory and Practice:
The Planned Reform to the Retrial to the Disadvantage of the Defend-
ant], Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 188, at 191
(4/2008).
149. According to this, one could consider genocide (§ 6 VStGB), and in cer-
tain cases crimes against humanity (§ 7 VStGB) and war crimes against
persons (§ 8 VStGB).
150. Ibid.
151. Cf. here S. Pabst, ‘Wider die Erweiterung der Wiederaufnahme zuun-
gunsten des Angeklagten. Eine zu Recht unterbliebene Reform’ [Against
the Extension of the Retrial to the Disadvantage of the Defendant. A
Rightfully Unfulfilled Reform], Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechts-
dogmatik 126 (2/2010).
152. BR-Drs. 222/10.
153. Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein
neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU,
CSU und SPD. [A New Start for Europe. A New Dynamic for Germany.
A New Cohesion for Our Country. Coalition Agreement between CDU,
CSU and SPD] 19th Legislative Period, n. 5853-5854 (accessible online
at https://tinyurl.com/y66cv3on (accessed on 26 July 2020).
154. Cf. here Velten, above n. 2, at 387.
opportunities for retrial to the disadvantage of the
defendant.155 While the Federal Minister of Justice and
Consumer Protection is showing a certain reluctance to
implement the project,156 the Ministers of Justice of the
German states have asked her at their autumn confer-
ence on 26 November 2020 to present a draft bill to
extend the provisions of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure regarding the retrial to the disadvantage of the
defendant ‘to include cases of the most serious crimes
where new scientific investigation methods make it pre-
dominantly probable that the perpetrator is subsequent-
ly proven guilty’.157
It is to be hoped that this initiative will ultimately
remain unsuccessful, as the project is being met with
fundamental constitutional concerns. In fact, the sug-
gestion of creating a general opportunity for retrial to
the disadvantage of the defendant on the grounds of
new facts is rightly being contested: In contrast to the
narrowly restricted grounds for retrial158 already stand-
ardised in basic law under § 362 nos. 1-4 StPO, this
would undermine the essence of the principle of ne bis in
idem which is granted a constitutional rank in § 103(3)
GG and which has been declared sacrosanct159 by the
Federal Constitutional Court.160 The sword of Damo-
cles, in the form of new facts or evidence which indicate
perpetration by the defendant with a degree of likeli-
hood satisfying the requirements of the grounds for
retrial, would always hang over any acquittal. Insofar as
a restriction to new knowledge from DNA analysis
which was not yet available at the time of the acquittals
has been suggested, it has been correctly pointed out
that the proposed revision would not be capable of solv-
ing the problem due to the general principle of non-ret-
roactivity.161 Moreover, the advance in criminal knowl-
edge as such, evoked in the reasoning of the failed drafts
155. Frister and Müller, above n. 7, at 101 citing a representative survey,
according to which approximately 91% of German citizens would wel-
come the extension being discussed.
156. ‘Mordprozesse trotz Freispruch wiederaufnehmen? Regierung prüft’
[Reopening Murder Trials Despite Acquittal?], Report from the Neue
Osnabrücker Zeitung of 9 July 2020; accessible online at https://
tinyurl.com/y434ow49 (accessed on 26 July 2020).
157. Decision of the Conference of Ministers of Justice on TOP II 1: Changes
in procedural law for long-standing serious crimes; accessible online at
https://tinyurl.com/y53c78un (accessed on 7 December 2020).
158. On the compatibility of this with the Grundgesetz, cf. Frister, above
n. 7, § 362.3 with citations.
159. Cf. BVerfGE 56, 22 (34-35).
160. In agreement, for example, Frister and Müller, above n. 7, at 103; ulti-
mately also A. Bohn, Die Wiederaufnahme des Strafverfahrens zuun-
gunsten des Angeklagten vor dem Hintergrund neuer Beweise [The
Retrying of Criminal Proceedings to the Disadvantage of the Defendant
in light of New Evidence] (2016), at 237; Greco, above n. 5, at 978-9;
generally also Engländer and Zimmermann, above n. 34, above
§ 359.43 (‘extremely dubious proposal under constitutional law’); Wis-
senschaftliche Dienste des Bundestages, Report WD 7 – 3000 – 121/16,
at 12 (‘weighted arguments against an … extension’). Conversely, for
compatibility of a corresponding proposal with the Grundgesetz cf. Kas-
par, above n. 38, § 362.14-15; C. Zehetgruber, ‘Ist eine Erweiterung
der Wiederaufnahmegründe zu Ungunsten des Angeklagten möglich?’
[Is an Extension of the Grounds for Retrial to the Disadvantage of the
Defendant Possible?], Juristische Rundschau 157, at 166 (2020).
161. Cf. Frister and Müller, above n. 7, at 103 under reference to Pabst,
above n. 151, at 130.
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of 2008 and 2010, is not in itself a new development;
rather it has its roots back in the 19th century and has
thus certainly been taken into account by the original
legislator.162 Furthermore, it is rightly pointed out that
even a positive DNA analysis result in and of itself is
not evidence of the guilt of the defendant, but is rather
evidence that he had contact with the trace carrier.163
Ultimately, the restriction to certain, particularly seri-
ous offences stipulated in the failed drafts is also ques-
tionable since one may doubt that such a restriction
would last long if, for example, serious suspicions would
be raised regarding acquittals in grave cases of child
abuse or series of violent robberies.164 It should be
remembered that the last undermining of the principle
of ne bis in idem occurred during the time of National
Socialism165 and that § 103(3) was added to the Grundge-
setz specifically in the light of these experiences.166 It is
hoped that the German government will reflect on these
historical connections and distance itself from the
proposal.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear that one of the most urgent
desiderata with respect to the law and practice of the
retrial process in Germany is the attainment of up-to-
date and meaningful empirical knowledge. However,
there is cause for hope that the joint interdisciplinary
project mentioned above (Section 4) will make a signifi-
cant contribution to filling existing gaps in knowledge.
Moreover, lesser reform issues have been formulated as
part of the analysis of the existing legal framework, for
example, the requirements to expand the scope of appli-
cation of § 359 no. 3 StPO to any form of conscious vio-
lation of public duty167 and to extend § 359 no. 6 StPO
to sentences which are based on a legal norm or legal
opinion declared to be in contravention of the Conven-
tion in another case.168 However, the wish for the retrial
in favour of the defendant to finally develop into the
effective quality assurance mechanism which the histor-
ical legislator had in mind169 and the functionality of
which lies not least of all in the interest of the general
162. Cf. Frister and Müller, above n. 7, at 103 under reference to the dacty-
loscopy first developed in the 19th century; also Marxen and Tiemann,
above n. 148, at 191.
163. Cf. Frister and Müller, above n. 7, at 103.
164. On the questionability of the criterion of offence, cf. the Report of the
Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Bundestages, above n. 160, at 14; and
Marxen and Tiemann, above n. 148, at 193.
165. Details on this Bayer, above n. 3, at 113 et seq.
166. Cf. H. Schulze-Fielitz, in H. Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz-Kommentar
[Grundgesetz Commentary] (3rd edn, 2018), § 103(3) GG n. 5.
167. Above under fn. 49.
168. Above under fn. 75.
169. Cf. here Marxen, above n. 75, at 325-4, who points out that historically
the fact that rulings of County Courts (Landgerichte), which are regu-
larly based on serious accusations, other than rulings of District Courts
(Amtsgerichte) are not subject to an appeal on points of fact and law
(Berufung, § 312 et seq. StPO), was justified by the possibility of a retri-
al. See here also Eschelbach, Geipel, Hettinger, Meller & Wille, above
n. 87, at 240-41.
public can ultimately be fulfilled by the judiciary alone –
through a more generous interpretation of § 359 et seq.
StPO bound to the basic legal concept of the right to
retrial.170
170. In this sense also Frister and Müller, above n. 7, at 104.
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